History and current perspective.
What information about a key should be available without invoking the key?
(For this section we consider a memory reference to a memory key to be an invocation as well as the use of a meter key as a meter.) We have argued that two node keys can be effectively compared by storing in slot 0 via one and fetching slot 0 via the other.
If you get what you stored then you probably have the same key.
No security is thus likely to be compromised by supporting the direct comparison provided by DISCRM.
This argument fails for two read-only page keys.
We have nonetheless have unleashed DISCRIM and have not yet regretted it.
We suggest here several further key scrutinizing functions and suggest similar arguments as to their safety.
See (p2,node-cmp) and (p2,keybits) for current functions.
Suppose a new order code on DISCRIM which took a node key and another key.
tell whether the other key designated the node and if so what was its key type and data byte.
It has been suggested that the domain tool should be required here but experiments like those above seem to reveal that information without the domain tool’s use anyway.
If the above is granted then it can be argued that the node range should provide the same service for each of their potential nodes without even having to guess the CDA of the node since otherwise the range key holder could do the test with DISCRIM for each node in the range.