Here we attempt an informal application of game theory to design a strategy that can serve the investor before he invests. I don’t yet see that legislation is needed, but it may help.

Roughly we will attempt a stochastic assessment of the value of the asset under some macro economic scenarios. We will not assign probabilities to these scenarios, although the investor may wish to do so. When it is obvious how to check for honesty, we will note this. The seller will attempt to arrange his information to increase expected valuations, but he will presumably make every attempt to avoid being caught lying. Perhaps legislation could help here.

I do not know if there are business reasons for the seller to conceal details of the asset, and reasons that the buyer might find reasonable. I will try here to respect confidentially to the degree that this is compatible with evaluating the asset. There are problems if the seller demands a non-disclosure agreement with the evaluator—some unethical strategies of double counting would motivate NDAs.

I assume that the builder of a asset will provide data in some standard format enumerating parts of the asset and their ostensible expected values.